November 2002

Update: Crime Victim Rights Manual

CHAPTER 4

Protection From Revictimization

4.12 Criminal Offenses That May Be Committed While Threatening or Intimidating a Victim

D. Malicious Use of the Telephone

Effective November 1, 2002, 2002 PA 577 amended numerous provisions of MCL 750.540e, including the maximum authorized fine. Accordingly, the quoted language in subsection 4.12(D) should be replaced as follows:

"(1) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor who maliciously uses any service provided by a telecommunications service provider with intent to terrorize, frighten, intimidate, threaten, harass, molest, or annoy another person, or to disturb the peace and quiet of another person by any of the following:

> "(a) Threatening physical harm or damage to any person or property in the course of a conversation or message through the use of a telecommunications service or device.

> > * * *

"(e) Repeatedly initiating a telephone call and, without speaking, deliberately hanging up or breaking the telephone connection as or after the telephone call is answered.

* * *

"(2) A person violating this section may be imprisoned for not more than 6 months or fined not more than \$1,000.00, or both. An offense is committed under this section if the communication terminates in this state and may be prosecuted at the place of origination or termination."

CHAPTER 8

The Crime Victim at Trial

8.9 Evidence of the Victim's Character

B. Criminal Sexual Conduct Cases

5. Cases Addressing the Defendant's Rights to Confrontation and to Present a Defense

Insert the following case summary at the end of Section 8.9(B)(5), after the summary of the *Powell* case:

In *Lewis v Wilkinson*, ____ F3d ____ (CA 6, 2002), a federal habeas corpus case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of rape in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas after he sexually penetrated the victim in her dorm room at the University of Akron. The defendant and victim were friends who met during their first year of college. The defense at trial was consent. At issue on appeal was the trial judge's refusal to admit into evidence specific portions of the victim's diary under Ohio's rape shield statute, which is substantially similar to Michigan's rape shield statute under MCL 750.520j. The diary entry at issue during the trial and on appeal was as follows (the excluded statement is italicized):

"I can't believe the trial's only a week away. I feel guilty (sort of) for trying to get Nate [the defendant] locked up, but his lack of respect for women is terrible. I remember how disrespectful he always was to all of us girls in the courtyard...he thinks females are a bunch of sex objects! And he's such a player! He was trying to get with Holly and me, and all the while he had a girlfriend. I think I pounced on Nate because he was the last straw. That, and because I've always seemed to need some drama in my life. Otherwise I get bored. That definitely needs to change. I'm sick of men taking advantage of me ... and I'm sick of myself for giving in to them. I'm not a nympho like all those guys think. I'm just not strong enough to say no to them. I'm tired of being a whore. This is where it ends. Id. at ____. [Emphasis added.]

The defendant claimed that the trial judge's failure to admit the italicized statements amounted to a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, dismissing the appeal as not involving any substantive constitutional question, even though the Supreme Court was

presented with defendant's Sixth Amendment issue. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied defendant's petition for habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of habeas relief, remanding with directions to issue a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when it refused to admit the foregoing italicized statements, finding that the judge could have reduced the prejudicial effect of such evidence by limiting the scope of cross-examination as to the victim's prior sexual activity and reputation:

"[Defendant] was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when the trial court excluded several statements from the alleged victim's diary. The statements at issue, especially when read with the diary entry in its entirety, can reasonably be said to form a particularized attack on the witness's credibility directed toward revealing possible ulterior motives, as well as implying her consent. This court recognizes the difficulty a trial judge faces in making an evidentiary decision with the urgency that surrounds the wrapping up of pretrial loose ends prior to the start of jury selection. The trial court took the state's interests in protecting rape victims into account in excluding the statement, but did not adequately consider the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. The jury should have been given the opportunity to hear the excluded diary statements and some cross examination [sic], from which they could have inferred, if they chose, that the alleged victim consented to have sex with the [defendant] and/or that the alleged victim pursued charges against the [defendant] as a way of getting back at other men who previously took advantage of her. The trial court can reduce the prejudicial effect of such evidence by limiting the scope of cross-examination as to the victim's prior sexual activity and her reputation." *Id*. at ...

CHAPTER 12

The Relationship Between Criminal or Juvenile Proceedings & Civil Actions Filed by Crime Victims

12.2 Statute of Limitations for Tort Actions

Insert the following	language at the	e end of the	first full	paragraph on t	n 298

See also *Hoekstra v Bose*, ___ Mich App ___ (2002), where the Court of Appeals held that under MCL 600.5856 the limitations period is tolled upon the proper filing and service of a complaint and summons, even though the court may not have acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant.